



Eastern Congo Policy Standard: MARCH 2008

The “3 Ps”: There is no one-size-fits-all approach to preventing, mitigating, or stopping, mass atrocities in eastern Congo. But there is an effective common strategy that can lead to success, and it is a simple one, built on promoting **peace**, providing civilian **protection**, and ensuring **punishment** of the perpetrators. These “3 Ps” can achieve the immediate goal of ending genocide and crimes against humanity while also helping to prevent similar atrocities from occurring in the future.

| | What the U.S. is doing now | What the U.S. <i>should</i> be doing |
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| Peace | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The U.S. appointed a senior advisor for conflict resolution, Tim Shortley, in September 2007, to support peace efforts in eastern Congo. ▪ The U.S. envoy—in close partnership with the European Union, United Nations, and African Union—has established dual tracks to deal with a rebellion led by dissident Congolese General Laurent Nkunda and the continued presence of Rwandan FDLR rebels in eastern Congo. ▪ Coordinated diplomacy has led to a ceasefire in North and South Kivu and an agreement between the Congolese and Rwandan governments (the Nairobi communiqué) on steps to remove the FDLR from eastern Congo. | <p>The administration must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish a permanent office in eastern Congo—with full-time staff from the State Department, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies—to sustain U.S. engagement in a peace process and stabilization programs. ▪ Formalize a “quartet” of guarantors—with the EU, the U.N., and the AU—that will maintain coordinated pressure on the parties to the parties—particularly General Nkunda and Congolese government—to fully implement the ceasefire in the Kivus. ▪ Pressure the Congolese and Rwandan governments to cooperate on fulfilling their commitments under the Nairobi communiqué. <p>Congress must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increase funding for stabilization programs, particularly the process of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration, or DDRRR. |
| Protection | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The U.S. pays approximately 27 percent of the UN Peacekeeping operation in the Congo’s (MONUC) \$1.1 million dollar annual budget. However, as of February 1, 2008 the state of U.S. debt and late payments to the UN for peacekeeping operations was \$1.68 billion. | <p>The administration must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Employ a stronger focus on sexual-violence reduction and prevention activities. This means deploying civilians (working for the United Nations or NGOs) to administer programs in urban and rural areas that reduce women’s exposure to sexual violence and deal with the trauma it inflicts. ▪ Provide equipment and training necessary to enhance MONUC’s capacity to monitor the flow of arms and engage in offensive military operations, should they become necessary, against the FDLR. <p>Congress must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pass <i>the International Violence Against Women Act (S. 2279)</i> as a small step toward ending violence against women in the Congo |

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| | | and around the world. |
| Punishment | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The U.S. provides funds for programs that provide legal aide to victims of sexual violence. ▪ The U.S. supports UN targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for furthering conflict in eastern Congo. | <p>The administration must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Publicly call for the International Criminal Court open an investigation into rape as a war crime in eastern Congo and provided information to assist the court in building indictments. ▪ Aggressively enforce existing UN targeted sanctions against the FDLR and press others—particularly EU member states and Canada—to do the same. <p>Congress must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Provide significant funds to assist the Congolese government to investigate, arrest, and try suspected criminals. Reforms should include formal mechanisms to protect the identity of witnesses in sexual violence investigations. |
| Prevention | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Preventing sexual violence in eastern Congo will require considerable political will and financial dedication to security sector reform, or SSR. When the military and police represent a grave threat to the civilians they are supposed to protect, as they do in Congo, SSR—restructuring and training the military and police to more effectively secure the country—is fundamental to improving human security and preventing atrocities. ▪ The U.S. has some funding for Security Sector Reform in Congo, though not nearly enough to deal with the problem. | <p>Working with other donors, the U.S. government should focus on three tasks.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Vetting: Help the Congolese government establish a verification mechanism to ensure that officers with a track record of criminal activity and rape do not receive important posts in the armed forces, the national police, and other security services. ▪ Justice: Support efforts by the Congolese army to deal with accusations of international human rights violation, with a particular focus on prosecuting and punishing members of the Congolese armed forces who commit acts of sexual violence and other atrocities. ▪ Training: Consider embedding military trainers in Congolese army units. Coordinating closely with MONUC, army training must include more education in human rights and measures and methods of civilian protection. |

Take Action: **Lead Your Leaders** and call your member of Congress (1-202-224-3121 from 9:00am- 6:00pm EST Mon- Fri). Explain to them the importance of meeting the ENOUGH policy standards outlined above. Forward movement on peace, protection and punishment is critical to finally ending the suffering in eastern Congo.

For other ways to get involved, go to www.enoughproject.org.